
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Understanding the Workweek of Foreign Born 
Workers in the United States
IZA DP No. 4317
July 2009
Fernando A. Lozano 
Understanding the Workweek of Foreign 





Fernando A. Lozano 
Pomona College, University of Michigan 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 










Understanding the Workweek of Foreign Born Workers 
in the United States
*
 
I analyze the length of the workweek of foreign-born workers in the U.S. I concentrate on 
workers supplying long hours of work − 50 or more weekly hours and document that 
immigrants are less likely than natives to work long hours. Surprisingly, these differences are 
greatest among highly educated and salary paid workers, and persists even after 
conditioning for demographic characteristics. I explain these differences with two within 
occupation characteristics. First, relative to natives, immigrants are less likely to supply long 
work weeks if they work in occupations where the immigrant-native earnings differential is 
big. Second, immigrants are also less likely to supply long work weeks when they work in 
occupations with a wide dispersion of earnings. This second result is important, because the 
occupation dispersion of earnings has been used to characterize changes of the worker's 
earnings over the worker life cycle (Bell and Freeman, 2001; Kuhn and Lozano, 2008), and a 
good measure of the incentives to supply long hours of work. 
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Today, foreign-born workers shape the United States' labor market. The US Census Bureau reports
that more than 30 million people currently living in the United States were born abroad. Not
surprisingly, economists have paid considerable attention to this group, and previous work spans
from their labor market performance (for example Chiswick 1977, Borjas 1985, 1995 among many
others) to their fertility decisions (Gordon and Macintosh, 2006). Nonetheless, little attention has
been paid to the length of the workweek of foreign-born workers, and whether it diers from that of
the native-born. While the conventional stereotype in the popular press is that immigrants tend to
work very long hours (for example DeConto, 2006 or Porter, 2006) this issue has yet to be examined
in depth.
Simultaneously, economists have been interested in understanding the consequences of workers'
long hours of work, and showed substantial evidence that working long hours is an important deter-
minant of future earnings growth. For example, using data from the U.S. and Germany, Bell and
Freeman (2001) show that hours of work are positively related to a workers' earnings growth and
future promotions. Further, and in a dierent paper, Bell and Freeman (1996) show that American
workers perceive that hours of work in the present will determine their earnings in the future. Simi-
larly, Bratti and Staolani (2007) use British household data to show that higher hours of work are
positively correlated with an increased probability of attaining a promotion, even after controlling
for worker heterogeneity. Perhaps, this is because long hours of work may work as a signal of the
worker's commitment to the rm and eort.
Not only do long workweeks relate to future earnings and other labor market opportunities,
but understanding the supply of hours is important to understand overall worker's welfare. Failing
to account for weekly hours of work may distort welfare analyses. For example, as Johnson and
Kuhn (2004) point out, if high income earners tend to supply longer hours, then increasing earnings
inequality may overstate welfare inequality as leisure is a normal good. Finally, and as Kuhn and
Lozano (2008) point out, understanding the trade o between leisure and market labor is important
as this allows us to better understand the quality and rhythm of someone's life.
1The goal of this paper is to document and explain any dierences in the number of weekly hours
of work between foreign-born and native workers. Following Kuhn and Lozano (2008), I focus on one
dimension of labor supply: workers supplying 50 or more hours per week (I will refer to these workers
as those supplying long hours hereafter). This contrasts with the previous literature on immigrant
labor supply, which concentrates, for example, on family labor supply (Beker and Benjamin, 1988;
Blau et al, 2003) or annual hours of work (Blau and Kahn, 2006). My results show that dierences
in the workweek between immigrants and natives dier across hourly and salary paid workers: after
controlling for demographic characteristics, hourly paid immigrants are as likely to work long hours
as their native counterparts, but long hours dierences still persist among salary paid workers.
Given this   perhaps surprising   result, I present two empirical results that potentially explain
these dierences: 1) Within occupation native-immigrant's dierences in hours of work are greatest
in occupations where earnings dierences between these groups are greatest; 2) Immigrants are less
likely to supply long weekly hours in occupations where the residual earnings dispersion (net of
demographic characteristics) is greatest. The rst result is not surprising, and is consistent with tra-
ditional labor supply models where hours of work depend on the worker's contemporaneous earnings.
But the second result is, since earnings inequality is not typically associated with traditional labor
supply analyses, and has only recently been adapted by labor economists (see Bell and Freeman,
2001 or Kuhn and Lozano, 2008).
The basic argument for using inequality as a determinant of labor supply is that hours in period
t will be positively associated with earnings in period t+1, perhaps because longer workweeks raise
the worker's future position on the within occupation earnings distribution. A wider spread of the
earnings distribution will in turn increase the incentive to supply long hours. As in the previous
literature, I assume that the within occupation earnings inequality is a good approximation for the
slope of a worker's lifetime earnings, and this is an important metric as it captures the future rewards
from working long hours. Heuristically, this is not dierent to tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen,
1981) in a work setting where workers' rewards are determined by the workers' relative outcomes, or
to eciency wages (Fehr et al, 1998) where higher wages are used to exert optimal eort from the
2worker. Again, the basic intuition is that as the within occupation earnings inequality widens, so
will the incentive to supply long hours. Further, these incentives will dier between hourly paid and
salary paid workers: hourly paid workers' input is veriable by the employer and can be rewarded on
concurrent compensation, but such is not the case for salary paid workers, where individual output
is observed only in the long run and eort not veriable by the employer (Fama, 1991).
If earnings inequality does capture the future stream of a worker's income, then this metric
should be at least as important to determine an immigrant worker's labor supply as the contempo-
raneous wage is. If an immigrant worker perceives a positive probability of job separation because of
either temporary or permanent return migration to the source country (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996;
Lubotsky, 2007), or further migration within the host country (DeVanzo, 1983), then the expecta-
tion of future migrations will change the slope of the worker's lifetime expected earnings and thus
change the incentives to supply long hours. Intuitively, my argument follows the results presented
either by Borjas (1982), Dustmann (1993) or Cortes (2004). Borjas explores the rate of economic
mobility of Hispanic immigrants in the U.S. and argues that Cuban immigrants   political refugees
  are more likely to invest in the host economy because they face higher costs of return migration
than other immigrants do. Dustmann argues that temporary migrants are less likely than perma-
nent migrants to invest in host-country specic human capital, and using German data shows that
temporary migrants show atter earnings assimilation proles as years in the host country increase.
Cortes (2004) shows that refugee migrants { with longer expected time horizon in the host country,
and thus higher incentive to invest in host country skills | have steeper wage assimilation proles
than economic immigrants and work on average more annual hours. The results in this paper are
similar to those in this literature: dierences in hours of work between salary paid immigrant and
native workers persist in occupations with wide earnings inequality. This suggests that an immigrant
worker's shorter expected time horizon in the source country attenuates the incentives to supply long
workweeks.
This paper highlights the importance that occupation characteristics have on an immigrant's time
allocation between market labor and leisure. Particularly important is the ability to accrue future
3rewards from working long hours today. To the extent that current hours of work determine future
labor market outcomes, it is important to consider any dierences between immigrant and native
workers in their incentives to supply long hours, as these will most likely determine the workers'
future prosperity and immigrants' earnings assimilation prole.
2. Data
The main dataset in this paper is the 1994-2006 NBER Collection of the Current Population Sur-
vey Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS ORG hereafter). This survey includes a battery of questions
regarding the respondents labor market activity, among them and exclusively in the Outgoing Rota-
tions, weekly earnings and whether the worker is salary or hourly paid. This survey has two added
advantages: it is collected continuously during the year, which makes it less sensitive to seasonal
variations in labor supply, and the number of observations is three times greater than the regular
CPS survey.
The main measure of labor supply in this paper is an indicator variable that takes a value of one
if the worker supplies 50 or more weekly hours in his main job, and zero otherwise. Concentrating on
workers supplying 50 hours or more has several advantages: rst, my analysis focuses on the upper
tail of the distribution of hours worked, which gives a better idea of a worker's tradeo between
leisure and labor market activity. Second, focusing on the length of the workweek is a better measure
of a workers willingness to supply high on the job eort. Third, this measure avoids problems due
to clustering of responses around one number, for example when respondents round their hours of
work to 40 hours per week. Finally, this measure is robust to temporary unemployment spells, and
vacation time.
In contrast to the previous literature which uses annual hours (Cortes, 2003 or Blau and Kahn,
2007) it can be argued that weekly hours of work captures a dierent dimension in the margin of a
worker's labor supply decision. It is important to consider the dierences in the marginal incentives
to supply an extra hour between two workers who supply the same amount of hours with dierent
intensities, for example one supplying 1980 annual hours by working 36 weeks at 55 hours per
4week, versus another immigrant working 40 hours a week for 50 weeks. Further, in the CPS annual
hours are computed using weeks worked multiplied by usual weekly hours. One last advantage of
analyzing weekly hours is that the question for weeks worked in the Decennial Census or in the
March Supplement of the Current Demographic Survey includes weeks of paid vacation and paid
sick leave, and as Coleman and Pencavel (1993) claim information of weeks worked indicates rms'
cost of employing workers more accurately than it does actual time worked.
The sample used in this paper is restricted to men. I choose to focus my analysis on men
because selection of weekly market hours by immigrant women is not random and likely to be more
sensitive to their partner's income. I restrict age to the 25-64 range since by this age presumably
most workers ended their investments in education. My control group throughout the paper is all
US born men, without distinction to ethnic group. Further, to avoid biases arising from including
immigrant children in the sample, the immigrants sample is composed of those immigrants who
arrived in the United States at age 16 or older. All monetary units are in 1994 dollars. Also, in this
paper I interchange the terms foreign-born with immigrant freely.
Table 1 presents the sample's summary statistics and the proportion of men in each group who
work long hours. The rst and third columns refer to US natives. The second and fourth columns
refer to foreign-born workers. Focusing on the sample means, immigrants are less likely than natives
to have a college degree and more likely to be high school dropouts { 35% of immigrants do not
have a high school degree while 29% of them have a college degree. Also, immigrants are more likely
to be younger than natives. Finally, foreign-born workers are 10 percentage points less likely to be
salary paid than natives and they are also less likely to be unionized.
Concentrating on the incidence of working long hours, native workers are more likely to work long
hours than immigrants do. Perhaps surprisingly, these dierences are greatest are among middle
aged, salary paid and highly educated workers. For example, among high school dropouts, natives
are 5 percentage points more likely to work long hours than immigrants. Among college graduates,
native workers are 11 percentage points more likely to work long hours. Among salaried paid workers,
natives are 11 percentage points more likely to work long hours than immigrants; among hourly paid
5workers, natives are only 4 percentage points more likely to work long hours.
Similarly, Figure 1 presents the proportion of workers working long hours by the wage quintile of
all working men. The left panel shows the proportion among all workers whose workweek is 50 hours
or longer and the right panel restricts the sample only to salary paid workers. Surprisingly again,
immigrants who belong to the highest quintile of the wage distribution are 10 percentage points less
likely to work long hours than native-born workers in the same income category. In contrast, the
dierence between immigrants and natives who are in the lowest wage quintile is only 1 percentage
point. If the sample is restricted to salary paid only the dierence among the highest paid workers
is 12 percentage points, the dierence among lowest earners is only 5 percentage points. While
it is interesting to note that immigrants are less likely to work long hours than natives who earn
similar wages, one must be aware that these averages are unconditional, and perhaps they reect
demographic and occupational dierences, an issue to which I turn next.
3. Dierences due to Demographic Characteristics
The rst exercise in this paper is to analyze to what extent the dierences between immigrants
and natives in the probability to work long hours are explained by dierences in demographic
characteristics. Particularly I test whether the number of years an immigrant has spent in the US
change the worker's probability to supply long hours. Ex-ante, it is not clear how years in the United
States would aect the workweek of foreign-born workers. It may be that as experience in the host
country is correlated with higher earnings (Chiswick, 1977; Borjas, 1985, 1995) and higher earnings
increase the opportunity cost of leisure, so will the probability of a long hours workweek will increase.
But, it is also not clear how selective non-random temporary and permanent out-migration (Borjas
and Bratsberg, 1996; Lubotsky, 2007) may determine the workweek. For example, if an immigrant
has a target level of savings and will work long hours until the target is attained, and then returns
to the source country, then recent immigrants should work much longer hours than earlier ones.
Conversely, if immigrants that are more likely to stay longer in the U.S. are more driven, then
workweeks for earlier arrivals should be longer than for recent ones.
6To analze this I use Borjas (1985, 1995) cohort analysis. My baseline specication for working
long hours lhit, for person i in year t is estimating the following linear probability model1.








it + it (1)
where C1
it represents an observation i in year t who arrived in the 1960 to 1979 cohort; C2
it represents
those who arrived between 1980 and 1985; C3
it represents those who arrived between 1986 and 1991;
C4
it represents those who arrived between 1992 and 1995; C5
it represents those who arrived between
1996 and 2000; and C6
it represents those who arrived between 2001 and 2006. The parameters of
interest are 1 to 4, and these are associated with the coecients of dichotomous variables that
represent an immigrants time spent in the United States: D1
it represents that immigrant i in survey
t has been in the US between 0-5 years, D2
it represents those who have been in the US between
6-10 years, D3
it represents those who have been in the US 11-20 years, and D4
it represents those who
have been in the US more than 20 years. Note that the reference group for the above coecients is
native-born workers, and the estimate of ^ k is the dierence in hours of work between an immigrant
that has been k years in the US and a native-born worker.
As an alternative to Equation 1, I also estimate means for working long hours conditional on
observed demographic characteristics:









it + it (2)
where xit is a vector composed of age controls (up to a quartic term), three education categories,
a variable indicating whether the worker lives in a metropolitan area or not, dummy variables for
whether the worker is married or has never been married, whether a worker is unionized or is covered
by a union, as well as indicators for six states (California, Florida, Illinois, Texas and New York-New
Jersey). In this specication I also include region xed eects and occupation-year xed eects. Note
that any dierences in the estimated coecients of ^ k between equations 1 and 2 can be attributed
1I use linear probability models instead of non-linear maximum likelihood methods, because in these latter ones
there is a risk that maximum likelihood methods bias the estimates of xed eects coecients. For a discussion see
Hsiao (1986).
7to the relationship between the characteristics included in vector x0
it and the probability to work
long hours.
I estimate equations 1 and 2 rst for all workers, then for salary paid and hourly paid workers
separately. The results are presented in Table 2. The rst three columns include all fulltime native
and foreign-born workers, the fourth, fth and sixth columns include all workers who are salary
paid, and the last three columns include hourly paid workers only. For each group, the rst column
includes estimates when no demographic controls besides cohort and years in U.S. are included, the
second column includes the demographic controls in the vector x0
it of equation (2) and the third
column includes occupation-year xed eects2. Note that the estimates for salary paid workers
change very little once demographic characteristics are added; in contrast, in the case of hourly paid
workers the Years in the U.S. attenuate by almost half their magnitude.
To summarize the results in Table 2, Figure 2 shows the dierence in predicted in probability
of working long hours for each immigrant cohort compared to native born workers, based on the
specication with all demographic controls except occupation/year xed eects. All variables, except
cohort and year in the U.S. indicators, are valued at their sample mean. The results for salary paid
workers are presented in the left panel, and for hourly paid workers are presented in the right
panel3. Focusing on salary paid workers rst, the results show that earlier immigrants are more
likely to work long hours than more recent immigrants, and that the probability of working long
hours decreases signicantly after 5 years in the Unites States. After year 5, the probability of an
immigrant working long hours changes by little, and if anything it rises, although this raise is not
statistically signicant. These results support the hypothesis that immigrants, particularly recent
ones, behave as target earners where they will work longer hours than their counterparts until they
reach a determined earnings level. Whether the drop in probability after year 5 is due to changes in
the sample composition (recent immigrants who work long hours return to the source countries) or
2Because the CPS occupation codes change between 2002 and 2003, I am not able to include pure occupation xed
eects. Instead , I generate a xed eect for each 2-digit detailed occupation every year (the cross product of the
occupation and year vectors).
3I exclude from the gure the predicted probability of working long hours of the earliest cohort, those who arrived
after 2001, as they have been in the U.S. for less than ve years and would be only a point in these gures, their
probability of working long hours is ^ 6 + ^ 1.
8due to changes in the hours of work of each worker is impossible to test with these data. In contrast
to salary paid workers, the hours of work for hourly paid immigrants are not very dierent to those
of native workers once demographic controls are added.
Note that adding a regressor for wages to equation 2 has the disadvantage that for salary paid
workers the dependent variable (hours of work) is the denominator of the wage variable, this may
result in the division bias discussed by Borjas (1980). To any extent, adding occupation xed
eects controls imperfectly for the worker's earnings, and when I do this, the coecients for years
in the United States and immigrant cohorts vary little. This suggests that within each occupation
category, immigrants are less likely to work long hours, and this is again concentrated among salaried
workers. It seems intuitive to explain the dierences above of the probability of working long hours
between natives and immigrants with a traditional life-cycle model (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999).
This framework suggests that given a wage level, immigrant workers should be solving their utility
maximizing problem in a shorter time horizon than native workers due to a positive probability of
returning to the source country in the future. If this is true and for a given level of lifetime earnings,
then immigrants should work longer hours than natives during their stay in the United States. While
it is possible that dierences in hours of work are driven by dierent life-cycle strategies the empirical
data { presented in Table 2 even after occupation xed eects are added { suggest that within a given
occupation, and potentially similar earnings, immigrants work less hours than natives. Perhaps the
main problem with explaining these dierences with a traditional life-cycle model is that dierences
in hours of work are concentrated among salary paid workers, and the life-cycle framework fails to
explain why the outcomes between hourly paid and salary paid workers dier.
4. Dierences Due to Occupation and Industry Distribution
The previous section shows that dierences in the probability of working long hours persist after
controlling for demographic characteristics, and even within occupations once year/occupation xed
eects are added. Next I explore whether these dierences are explained with dierences in the
distribution of workers across occupations. I use detailed three-digit occupation codes and perform
















i = 1); also, let
lhk
i be the proportion of workers from group k that work long hours in occupation i (where k;j 2
natives, immigrants); then the proportion working 50 or more hours in occupation i from group
k if they have the same occupation distribution of group j, will be 
j
i  lhk
i . Summing across all
occupations gives the probability that workers in group k work long hours if they have the same
distribution as group j which is lh
jk
i .
I calculate these counterfactuals for 3-digit occupation and industry codes, and the results are
presented in Table 3. Note that in this sample the overall dierence in probability of working
long hours between natives and immigrants is 7 percentage points. The results in Table 3 indicate
that if salaried immigrant workers have the same occupation mix as natives, the long hours gap
would increase to 8 percentage points. This suggests that changing the occupation distribution of
immigrants to that of natives will have little impact on the hours of work of the foreign-born, and
if any, it will increase this gap slightly. A similar exercise shows that dierences in industry mix
explain none of the dierences between native and immigrant workers. Note that in this sample the
overall dierence in probability of working long hours between native and immigrants is 7 percentage
points. The results in Table 3 indicate that if salaried immigrant workers had the same occupation
mix as natives, the long hours gap would increase to 8 percentage points. This suggests that changing
the occupation distribution of immigrants to that of natives will have little impact on the hours of
work of the foreign-born, and if any, it will increase slightly this gap. A similar exercise shows that
dierences in industry mix explain none of the dierences between native and immigrant workers.
4To keep occupation and industries consistent, in here I use the 1994-2002 CPS ORG sample. Starting in 2003 the
occupation and industry classication is not consistent with those in previous surveys. Further, I restrict my sample
to occupations with at least 25 immigrant workers. Note that the predicted means in this exercise will be dierent to
those in table 1, because the samples are dierent.
105. Dierences Across Occupations in Incentives to Supply Long Hours
If dierences in occupation distribution fail to explain the dierences in the workweek of salary
paid native and immigrant workers, next I explore the extent to which these dierences lie in the
characteristics of each occupation. In particular I analyze whether dierences in the dispersion of
earnings predicts dierent hours of work between immigrant and native workers. I follow Bell and
Freeman (2001a, 2001b) who argue that greater within occupation earnings dispersion incentivizes
the worker to supply longer weekly hours, as long workweeks are associated with greater future
rewards   perhaps though a promotion, increases in earnings, or even a lower probability of being
laid o. Heuristically, this can be thought of as a tournament (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) where
the winner receives a higher payo, and to the extent that working long hours is related to the
probability of winning the tournament, workers will have a stronger incentive to supply that extra
hour of work. Here, I use two metrics to estimate the within occupation dispersion of earnings: rst,
as Bell and Freeman (2001a, 2001b) do the within occupation standard deviation of weekly earnings;
second, following Kuhn and Lozano (2008) the gap in the within-occupation 90th and 10th percentile
earners. More formally, the linear probability model estimated in this section is 5:












ijt +  Ejt + x0
it + ijt (4)
where k estimates the association between the probability of working long hours for each years
in the U.S. group (where k = 0 are U.S. born natives) and the within occupation distribution of
income. The variable lhijt takes a value of one if the workweek is 50 hours or longer, zero otherwise;
Ejt represents the occupation/year average
ln
weekly earnings, the variable Sjt represents the occupation/year standard deviation or 90 10 earn-
ings dierence; the vector x0
it includes all demographic variables as in equation 2. Again, I estimate
equation 4 for salary paid and hourly paid workers separately. Note that the above specication
5To take advantage of the complete sample I use the occupation-year cross product. The results are robust if I use
the sample between 1994 2002 and use pooled occupation categories instead
11allows for the occupation level of earnings to vary across dierent years in the U.S. category6.
Estimates of equation 4 are presented in Table 4. The rst column presents estimates for salary
paid workers when the occupation earnings dispersion is measured with the standard deviation of ln
weekly earnings. The second column presents estimates for salary paid workers when the dispersion
of earnings is measured with the dierence in earnings between the 90th percentile and the 10th
percentile. The third and fourth column replicates the exercise for hourly paid workers. Two
dierences in the estimates between hourly paid and salaried workers are worth noting: rst, while
the interaction estimates for salary paid workers are positive and signicant, the estimates for hourly
paid are negative; second, the magnitude of the intercepts for each year in the U.S. category for
salary paid is negative, and for hourly paid is positive and greatest for the most recent immigrants.
To understand the magnitude of these estimates, Table 5 presents the predicted incidence of
working long hours for salary paid and hourly paid workers, evaluated at dierent percentiles in the
across occupations' earnings distribution (all other variables are evaluated at sample means). The
results show that among salary paid workers employed in occupations where earnings dispersion is
compact (at the 10th percentile) native workers have a predicted probability of working long hours
of 28.5%; immigrants who have been in the U.S. between 0-5 years have a probability of working
long hours of 20%; those who have been in the U.S. for 6-10 years have a probability of 17.2%;
those who have been in the U.S. between 11-20 years have a probability of 17.5%; while the earliest
immigrants have a probability of working long hours of 19%. The estimates for hourly paid workers
are: natives 10%, recent immigrants 10% and this probability monotonically decreases to 8% for the
earliest immigrants. Importantly, note that as the occupation dispersion of earnings increases, so
will the the propensity of working long hours for all salary paid workers, not so for hourly paid.
Analyzing changes across the table towards occupations with greater earnings dispersion increases
the probability of working long hours for salary paid workers, and while absolute changes between
natives and immigrants are similar, the relative dierences between nativity groups do decrease. For
example while an immigrant worker who has been in the U.S for less than ve years and works in an
6As in the previous section I drop observations in which each occupation/year has less than 25 immigrant obser-
vations, and to control for outliers I further drop from the sample observations supplying more than 80 hours of work
in their main job.
12occupation in the 10th percentile of the dispersion distribution is 30% less likely to work long hours
than a native born worker, a similar immigrant working in an occupation in the 90th percentile
is 20% less likely to work long hours than a native born worker. In contrast, moving to a higher
dispersion occupation changes little the long hours incidence for hourly paid workers.
I readily admit that it is quite possible that immigrants who have a stronger preference for long
workweeks, stronger drive, or smaller cost of eort are more likely to sort themselves into high
earnings dispersion occupations, and the relative reduction in dierences between immigrants' and
natives' hours may be due to this sorting. While I can't argue that these results are causal, I do see a
strong positive association between hours and the occupations' earnings distribution. These results
are also consistent with the hypothesis that recent immigrants behave as target earners, who tend
to supply very long hours until they reach a desired level of earnings. This diers with immigrants
who have been in the U.S. for more than ve years, where there is little variation in the propensity
of working long hours and rise slightly over the rest of the worker's life cycle. Estimates using the
90-10 earnings gap as measure of earnings dispersion are similar. Yet, the reversal of signs between
hourly paid workers and salary paid workers suggest that these workers face very dierent labor
market incentives. Still, and because nativity dierences in the probability of working long hours
among hourly paid workers are very small, I leave this question as topic of future research and in
what follows concentrate on dierences among salary paid workers.
6. Aggregated Analysis on Dierences due to Occupation Characteristics
The results in section 3 suggested that even after controlling for demographic characteristics, and
as well as controlling for occupation-year heterogeneity, dierences in the incidence of long hours
of work still persist. Further, the analysis in section 4 shows that these dierences are not due to
dierent distributions across occupations. Yet, the results in the last section suggest that greater
within occupation earnings dispersion is positively associated with a worker's propensity to work long
hours, and that dierences in long hours between natives and immigrants decrease as the occupation's
dispersion of earnings widens. In this section, I aggregate the data into each occupation/year to
13further explore which occupation's characteristics are associated more strongly with immigrant-
natives dierences of hours of work.
The following exercise consist in analyzing the association between immigrant-native dierences
in hours of work and ten dierent occupation characteristics. The rst four occupation characteristics
are traditionally associated with labor supply studies and refer to the rst moment of the within
occupation earnings distribution: these are ln weekly earnings, ln hourly wage, the immigrant-
native dierences in ln weekly earnings, and the immigrant-native dierences in ln hourly wages.
The second set of variables, following Kuhn and Lozano (2008), dene the long hours premium as
a very crude approximations of the contemporaneous returns to working long hours. In particular,
I estimate a linear long hours premium which is the coecient 1 when estimating the following
regression for each occupation/year category separately (400 times, one for each occupation J and
year T combination):
EiJT = 0 + 1HiJT + x0
iJT + iJT (5)
where EiJt is the natural log of weekly earnings for worker i in year T and occupation J, HiJT is that
worker's usual hours of work in the main job, and x0
iJT is a vector including age, age squared, age
cube and age quartic, education dummies, regional variables, marital status, metropolitan status
and union status. Again, I recover ^ 1 for each occupation and dene it as a linear long hours
premium. Alternatively, I estimate a quartic long hours premium which is the dierence for each
occupation/year category of the predicted ln weekly earnings estimates at 40 hours and at 55 hours
from the following regression:




iJT + iJT (6)
whose elements are dened as in equation 5 above, but has up to a quartic term of usual hours in the
main job. Again, I estimate equation 6 separately for each occupation/year category. The last four
occupation characteristics, also borrowed from Kuhn and Lozano (2008), estimate the dispersion of
14earnings across occupations: the rst one is the standard deviation of ln weekly earnings, the second
one is the 90-10 Gap of weekly earnings, the third one is the standard deviation of the residuals
from equation 6, and the last one is the 90-10 Gap of the residuals from equation 6.
To understand the role that occupation characteristics play on the hours of work of immigrant
workers, I regress the dierence in long hours between natives and immigrants on each of the above
ten characteristics. Each regression is further estimated using year xed eects, and weighting each
cell by its number of observations. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 7. The
rst column includes all immigrants in each occupation/year, and the second and third column
partitions the sample into recent immigrants who have spent 0-10 years in the United States, and
earlier immigrants who have spent 11+ years in the U.S. The results for the rst two rows in Table
7 show that the occupation's level of ln weekly earnings and ln hourly wages have no relationship
with native-immigrant dierences in the probability of working long hours, but the third and fourth
rows do show that earnings dierences between native-immigrant are positively associated with the
dierence in probability of working long hours. This result is not surprising and it suggests positive
elasticities of labor supply. That is, immigrants supply shorter hours of work than natives in the
same occupation because they have lower earnings, and hence a lower opportunity cost of leisure (of
course as long as leisure is a normal good).
The second panel in Table 6 tests whether two measures that proxy for the returns to working
long hours are associated with greater immigrant-native incidence of long work weeks. The rst
one, the coecient of weekly earnings on usual hours of work from equation 5, shows no association
between the long hours premium and long hours dierences. The same is true   no association
with long hours dierences   when I use the quartic hours specication in equation 6 and compare
earnings of workers at 40 usual weekly hours versus earnings of workers at 55 usual weekly hours.
The bottom panel, shows four dierent measures of within occupation earnings dispersion, note
that all coecients are positive, and all but three are statistically signicant dierent to zero at the
95% condence level. That is, the results in this panel show that within occupation distribution of
earnings are positively associated with immigrant-natives dierences in the probability of working
15more than 50 hours. Importantly, the positive estimates of the coecients of the standard deviation
of ln earnings, and the 90-10 Gap of ln earnings are consistent with the estimates from Table 4 and
Table 5. Further, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the estimates in the last two measures
(standard deviation of residuals and 90-10 residual gap) are almost twice as big as the magnitude
of the rst two measures (standard deviation of ln earnings and 90-10 ln earnings gap). This
is important because the residual measures reect the within occupation distribution net of very
detailed demographic and hours controls.
Finally, I estimate regressions of occupation dierences in long workweeks on a measure of the
rst moment of the earnings distribution (native-immgrants ln earnings dierence) and a second
moment of the earnings distribution or the long hours premium. Again, each observation represents
an occupation/year category, each regression includes year xed eects and is weighted by the
cell's number of observations. The rst two rows regress long hours dierences on ln earnings
dierences and the within occupation long hours earnings premium. Note that the coecient for ln
earnings dierences remains positive and statistically signicant, but the coecient for the long hours
premium is now negative and statistically signicant dierent from zero. This result suggests that
once one controls for an immigrant earnings level relative to natives, immigrants are more likely to
have a positive association between the probability of working long hours and the contemporaneous
premium from working long hours. This is true regardless of which long hours premium measure I
use, and suggests that more immigrants would be willing to work long hours than natives, holding
constant their earnings level and return to working those long hours.
The next two panels show estimates of dierences in the workweek's length regressed on dif-
ference in ln earnings and the standard deviation of ln earnings (or the 90-10 ln earnings gap).
Once earnings dierences are added, the coecients for these two dispersion measures attenuate
towards zero, and neither is statistically signicant greater than zero. Importantly, the coecient
for dierence in ln weekly earnings remains positive and statistically signicant dierent than zero.
The last two panels show regressions of dierences in long workweeks on earnings dierences and
the residuals dispersion estimates from equation 6. When my explanatory variables are ln earnings
16dierences and the standard deviation of the ln earnings residuals, the coecient for the dispersion
measures decreases in magnitude as well, yet is still statistically signicant when all immigrants
are included. When the measure is the 90-10 Residuals Gap, the coecient remains positive in all
cases, and statistically signicant greater than zero in the case of all immigrants or in the case of
earlier immigrants. Importantly, these results suggest that dierences in hours of work are not only
associated with dierences in native-immgrant earnings level, but also that dierences in hours of
work are associated with the within occupation earnings dispersion   especially once that observed
hours of work and demographic characteristics are netted out. Further, and to the extent that these
dispersion measures are appropriate proxies for the future rewards to the worker from working long
hours (future earnings growth or promotions represented with wider distributions of earnings), the
within occupation incentives to supply long hours for immigrants are attenuated relative to natives'.
If in contrast one focuses on contemporaneous returns to working long hours   the long hours
premium   then the association between these incentives and native-immigrant dierences in the
probability of working long hours is negative. That is, increases in the contemporaneous rewards
such as the long hours premium decrease the dierences in the probability to work long hours.
7. Discussion
The results in the previous section show that occupation characteristics are important determinants
of the dierences in the length of the workweek between immigrants and natives. Two factors
that reduce the hours of work by immigrants are lower earnings compared to native workers within
the same occupation, and the dispersion of earnings within each occupation. This second metric is
important, as it is an approximation of the expected change in earnings of a worker's lifetime income
path. Importantly, if an immigrant salary paid worker perceives a positive probability of future
separation from his job then these incentives will diminish. These two measures are not intended to
be silver bullets that will completely explain all of the dierences, but rather to bring attention to
the importance of occupation characteristics on an immigrant labor supply time allocation problem.
I have paid little attention to any demand side dierences explaining this gap. It may be that
17this gap is a consequence of three demand-side phenomena: the rst one is that foreign-born workers
are less likely to work long hours than US born natives because immigrants labor supply is more
sensitive to weak labor market conditions. This seems plausible for hourly paid workers but not
for salaried workers particularly full-time salaried workers{ since arguably these workers have more
discretion over the amount of hours they choose to work. Also any eects from weak labor market
conditions will be reected in labor force participation or employment (extensive margin), not weekly
hours of work (intensive margin). A similar argument is that immigrants supply less hours of work
because of unobserved non-market mechanisms like discrimination. If this is true, it strikes me that
discrimination will also have an eect on the hiring decision of a salaried worker, not on the decision
to demand long hours of work from him or not.
It may also be that immigrants work shorter hours than natives because they are constrained in
the number of hours they can work (Altonji and Paxson, 1988). Assume that each job is associated
with a given number of hours and weekly earnings, and due to search costs and labor market
frictions, an immigrant worker is not able to nd a job that maximizes his utility on desired hours
and earnings that is, he is not over his labor supply curve. Assume that a worker is supplying
less hours of work than he wishes to, then this worker will be underemployed, which could result in
the worker being: 1) more likely to switch jobs seeking to nd one where he maximizes his utility
with desired hours/earnings; and 2) more likely to work shorter hours in the old job relative to the
new job. I cannot distinguish in the data the explanation from the previous section that attributes
dierences in the probability of working long hours to to occupation characteristics from the fact
that immigrant workers are potentially underemployed. Quite possibly these two explanations occur
simultaneously in some cases.
8. Conclusion
In this paper I document the dierences of hours worked by foreign-born and native-born workers.
Analyzing the hours of work of immigrants is interesting as it potentially represents the eort and
dedication that a worker invests in his job. Equally important, hours of work are associated with
18higher future earnings and promotions. I concentrate my analysis on a particular measure of labor
supply: the upper tail of the distribution of hours worked, represented by workers supplying 50 or
more weekly hours. I nd that immigrants are less likely to work long hours than natives, and that
these dierences are surprisingly greatest among salaried, college graduates or high-income workers.
I explain dierences in the propensity to work long hours using two within occupation measures:
rst, immigrants tend to work shorter hours than natives in occupations where native-immigrant
earnings dierences are big. Second, immigrants also tend to work shorter weekly hours in occupa-
tions where the residual wage inequality is wide. This second measure is important as it has been
argued to be a good proxy for potential future earnings growth, and the wider the occupation's
earnings distribution, the greater the incentives to supply long hours of work. These results imply
that if an immigrant worker perceives a positive probability of separating from his job due to return
migration or further migration, then these incentives to work long weekly hours will attenuate.
This paper also highlights the importance that incentives play on an immigrant worker's invest-
ments in host country specic capital. In particular, attenuating the incentives to work long hours
due to a positive probability of future migration, generates a moral hazard where shorter hours
will result in lower earnings growth for the worker and a smaller probability of future promotions.
This, in turn, will atten an immigrant worker's assimilation earnings prole. Not only will this
have negative repercussions on the economic well-being of the worker and his family, but of the U.S.
economy as a whole given that foreign born workers constitute now such an important portion of
America's labor force.
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Table 1. Sample Proportions and Proportion Working Long Hours 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








  Proportion Sample  Proportion Long Hours 
  Among all not self-employed men 
Employed  0.936  0.932  0.209  0.125 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Fulltime Employed (29+ Hrs)  0.850  0.847  0.215  0.129 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Observations  842,639  99,953 
  Among full time employed, not self-employed men 
Hourly Paid  0.516  0.605  0.105  0.066 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Salaried Paid  0.484  0.395  0.333  0.226 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Union Member  0.203  0.123  0.132  0.070 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age 25-34  0.297  0.332  0.203  0.121 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age 35-44  0.323  0.337  0.229  0.140 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age 45-54  0.262  0.223  0.221  0.129 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Age 55-64  0.118  0.108  0.196  0.118 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
High School Dropout  0.072  0.348  0.132  0.083 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
High School Graduate  0.330  0.228  0.156  0.103 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Some College  0.283  0.133  0.192  0.121 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
College Graduate  0.314  0.291  0.318  0.207 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
N  713,961  84,607  713,961  84,607 
Sample: All not self-employed men in the CPS ORG age 25-64 (1994-2006) 
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Table 2. Linear Probability Model including Cohort and U.S. Experience Controls 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  All Workers  Salary Paid Workers  Hourly Paid Workers 
Arrived 1960-1969  -0.005  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.016  0.017  -0.008  -0.011*  -0.011* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Arrived 1970-1979  -0.011*  0.000  -0.002  -0.002  0.022  0.026*  -0.014*  -0.017*  -0.018* 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Arrived 1980-1989  -0.024*  -0.011  -0.016*  -0.016  0.005  0.008  -0.027*  -0.027*  -0.031* 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Arrived 1990-1996  -0.048*  -0.028*  -0.029*  -0.053*  -0.024  -0.007  -0.036*  -0.036*  -0.043* 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Arrived 1997-2006  -0.072*  -0.035*  -0.040*  -0.083*  -0.042*  -0.032  -0.046*  -0.040*  -0.049* 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
0-5 Years in US  -0.031*  -0.037*  -0.019*  -0.039*  -0.072*  -0.055*  -0.004  -0.001  0.013 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
6-10 Years in US  -0.070*  -0.063*  -0.047*  -0.097*  -0.123*  -0.104*  -0.020*  -0.015*  -0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
11-20 Years in US  -0.077*  -0.068*  -0.056*  -0.101*  -0.120*  -0.104*  -0.031*  -0.024*  -0.017* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
20+ Years in US  -0.083*  -0.062*  -0.051*  -0.110*  -0.100*  -0.082*  -0.043*  -0.027*  -0.022* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant  0.218*  -0.873*  -0.810*  0.336*  -1.394*  -1.180*  0.108*  -0.569*  -0.522* 
  (0.001)  (0.141)  (0.138)  (0.001)  (0.260)  (0.254)  (0.001)  (0.148)  (0.147) 
Demographic Controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Occ-Year Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
R-squared  0.004  0.091  0.129  0.004  0.029  0.090  0.002  0.008  0.025 
N  798,568  377,452  421,116 
* Denotes statistically significant at 5% significance level. Sample: All fulltime working men age 25-64 in the 1994-2006 CPS ORG. 
Demographic controls include married status, age, age squared, age cubic, age quartic, education indicators (high school graduates, some college, college 
graduates), year and region fixed effects, controls for living in California, Texas, Illinois, Florida and New-York-New Jersey, indicators for salary paid, 
metropolitan status and union membership.    
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Table 3. Detailed 3-Digit Occupation and Industry Counterfactuals 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Distribution:  U.S. Native  Foreign Born  U.S. Native  Foreign Born 
Means:  U.S. native  Foreign Born  Foreign Born  U.S. Native 
Cell Count 
A) All Workers       
3-Digit Occupation   0.202  0.139  0.139  0.177  241 
3-Digit Industry  0.211  0.139  0.130  0.223  186 
B) Salary Paid       
3-Digit Occupation   0.302  0.246  0.224  0.321  147 
3-Digit Industry  0.307  0.243  0.199  0.363  130 
C) Hourly Paid       
3-Digit Occupation   0.086  0.071  0.063  0.088  162 
3-Digit Industry  0.100  0.072  0.062  0.105  156 
Sample: All salary and hourly paid, full time, not self employed men age 25-64 in the CPS ORG 1994-2002. observations are 
restricted to occupations with at least 25 immigrant workers or industries with at least 25 immigrant workers. 
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Table 4. OLS Regression including Occupation Wages and Dispersion Measures 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable P(Long Hours)=1  Salaried Paid  Hourly Paid 








0-5 Years  -0.098*  -0.112*  0.096*  0.164* 
  (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.042)  (0.038) 
5-10 Years  -0.052  -0.051*  0.057  0.106* 
  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.038) 
11-20 Years  -0.067*  -0.025*  0.056  0.104* 
  (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
20+ Years  -0.092*  -0.111*  0.053  0.110* 
  (0.032)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.036) 
Natives X Occ Earnings Dispersion  0.561*  0.456*  0.025  0.057* 
  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.007) 
0-5 Yrs X Occ Earnings Dispersion  0.596*  0.492*  -0.202*  -0.096* 
  (0.062)  (0.034)  (0.096)  (0.035) 
6-10 Yrs X Occ Earnings Dispersion  0.426*  0.404*  -0.141  -0.054 
  (0.057)  (0.033)  (0.090)  (0.035) 
11-20 Yrs X Occ Earnings Dispersion  0.467*  0.387*  -0.157*  -0.062* 
  (0.050)  (0.028)  (0.069)  (0.029) 
20+ Yrs X Occ Earnings Dispersion  0.554*  0.475*  -0.156*  -0.070* 
  (0.057)  (0.031)  (0.083)  (0.034) 
Constant  -1.790  -2.012  -0.663  -0.693 
  (0.264)  (0.262)  (0.149)  (0.149) 
R-Squared  0.035  0.049  0.009  0.009 
N   363,858  363,858  415,181  415,181 
* Denotes statistically significant at 5% significance level. Sample: All salary and hourly  paid, 
full time, not self employed men age 25-64 in the CPS ORG 1994-2006, observations are 
restricted to occupations-years with at least 25 immigrant workers. Variables omitted from 
estimation are average cohort dummy variables, occupation earnings, age, age squared, cubic and 
quartic terms in age, education categories, marital status, union status, year and region dummies, 
as well as dummies representing whether the workers lived in California, Florida, Illinois, New 
Jersey-New York and Texas..   26 
Table 5. Predicted Probability of Working Long Hours (by Nativity and Years in the U.S.)  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Occupation Percentile in the Distribution of Standard Deviation ln Earnings  
  10  25  50  75  90 
  Salary Paid Workers 
U.S. Natives  0.285  0.301  0.328  0.356  0.379 
0-5 Years  0.203  0.220  0.248  0.278  0.303 
6-10 Years  0.172  0.184  0.204  0.226  0.243 
11-20 Years  0.175  0.189  0.210  0.234  0.253 
20+ Years  0.190  0.206  0.232  0.260  0.283 
  Hourly Paid Workers 
U.S. Natives  0.101  0.101  0.102  0.102  0.103 
0-5 Years  0.107  0.103  0.100  0.096  0.090 
6-10 Years  0.091  0.089  0.086  0.084  0.080 
11-20 Years  0.084  0.081  0.078  0.076  0.071 
20+ Years  0.082  0.079  0.076  0.074  0.069 
Predicted estimates using estimates from Table 4, Column 1 from Equation 4 at different values of the occupation 
earnings distribution. All other variables are estimated at the sample mean for each sub-group.   
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Table 6. Univariate Regression Coefficients of Difference on Incidence in Long Hours on 
Different Occupation/Year Characteristics 
Sample: Salaried Workers Only 
Dependent Variable: Difference between natives and Immigrants in Long Hours 
 








Earnings Measures     
a). ln Weekly Earnings  -0.007  -0.015  -0.014 
  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
b). ln Hourly Wage  -0.025  -0.037  -0.041 
  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.021) 
c) Difference ln Earnings  0.137*  0.126*  0.110* 
  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.036) 
d) Difference ln Wage  0.062*  0.043  0.020 
  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.035) 
Long Hours Premium     
e) Long Hours Premium Linear Coefficient   -0.011  -0.024  -0.015 
  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
f) Long Hours Premium Quartic Specification  -0.008  -0.008  -0.007 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
Earnings Dispersion Measures     
g) Standard Deviation ln Earnings  0.088*  0.091  0.077 
  (0.041)  (0.057)  (0.058) 
h) 90-10 Gap ln Earnings  0.065*  0.059  0.094* 
  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.034) 
i) Std Deviation Residual ln Earnings  0.171*  0.155*  0.154* 
  (0.050)  (0.074)  (0.071) 
j) 90-10 Diff Residual ln Earnings  0.105*  0.090*  0.138* 
  (0.028)  (0.047)  (0.041) 
* Denotes statistically significant at 5% significance level. Sample: All salary and hourly  
paid, full time, not self employed men age 25-64 in the CPS ORG 1994-2006, Each 
observation is an occupation/year category (N=400). All regressions include year fixed 
effects, and each cell is weighted by the number of observations in the occupation/year 
category.  
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Table 7. Bivariate Regression Coefficients of Difference on Incidence in Long Hours on Different 
Occupation/Year Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Difference between natives and Immigrants in Long Hours 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 





a) Long Hours Premium Linear Coefficient   -0.027*  -0.034*  -0.027* 
  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
Difference ln Weekly Earnings  0.150*  0.134*  0.117* 
  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.039) 
b) Long Hours Premium Quartic Specification  -0.008*  -0.008*  -0.007* 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
Difference ln Weekly Earnings  0.137*  0.126*  0.111* 
  (0.024)  (0.030)  (0.036) 
c) Standard Deviation ln Earnings  0.006  0.027  0.011 
  (0.040)  (0.062)  (0.059) 
Difference ln Weekly Earnings  0.136*  0.124*  0.109* 
  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.038) 
d) 90-10 Gap ln Earnings  0.036  0.052  0.064 
  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Difference ln Earnings  0.127*  0.124*  0.095* 
  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.038) 
e) Std Deviation Residual ln Earnings  0.105*  0.111  0.087 
  (0.048)  (0.075)  (0.070) 
Difference ln Earnings  0.125*  0.120*  0.103* 
  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.038) 
f)  90-10 Differential Residual ln Earnings  0.067*  0.069  0.101* 
  (0.029)  (0.046)  (0.044) 
Difference ln Earnings  0.121*  0.120*  0.091* 
  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.038) 
* Denotes statistically significant at 5% significance level. Sample: All salary and hourly  paid, full 
time, not self employed men age 25-64 in the CPS ORG 1994-2006, Each observation is an 
occupation/year category (N=400). All regressions include year fixed effects, and each cell is 
weighted by the number of observations in the occupation/year category.  



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Predicted Differences in Probability of Working Long Hours
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